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Abstract
The rational choice theory is based on this idea that people rationally pursue goals for
increasing their personal interests. In most conditions, the behavior of an actor is not
independent of the person and others’ behavior. Here, we present a new concept of
rational choice as a hyper-rational choice which in this concept, the actor thinks about
profit or loss of other actors in addition to his personal profit or loss and then will
choose an action which is desirable to him. We implement the hyper-rational choice
to generalize and expand the game theory. Results of this study will help to model
the behavior of people considering environmental conditions, the kind of behavior
interactive, valuation system of itself and others and system of beliefs and internal
values of societies. Hyper-rationality helps us understand how human decision makers
behave in interactive decisions.
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Introduction
The rational choice theory is one of the theories which predict humans and
societies’ behavior in social sciences. The main hypothesis in the prediction of
humans’ behavior is that these behaviors have almost rational and targeted trend.
In this theory, society is a set of the people which has rational action. Principles
and fundamentals of the rational actor are the basis of all social sciences theories
which have been explained by some theorists such as Marx Weber [6], James
Coleman [7], Raymond Boudon [8], John Elster [9] this theory has been also
criticized by many theorists. Harsanyi [10] defines rational action in routine life
as a behavior through which people choose the best accessible means to achieve a
definite goal. The first and yet the main application of the rational choice theory
beyond economics is to use it in politics [11]. Herbert Simon is most famous
for what is known to economists as the theory of bounded rationality, bounded
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rationality is the idea that in decision-making, rationality of individuals is limited
by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the
finite amount of time they have to make a decision [12]. The most important
theories based on the rational choice theory is decision-making theory [13, 14],
Collective action theory [15] and game theory [16]. The theory of rational choice
is one of the most important components of many game theory models. Hence,
the rationality of the players is one of the fundamental principles which led to
generalization and expansion of this theory. The assumption of rational behavior
is based on the fact that each player intends to optimize or seek the maximum
benefit.
A choice of behavior in a single person decision-making problem is called
player’s action. The set of actions available is shown with A. Function u : A→ R
which relates a outcome such as u(a) with numerical value to every member a in
A is called payoff function. An individuals desires lead to a ranking of outcomes
in terms of preference [17]. If a person prefers outcome a1 to outcome a2, we will
show it as a1 ¿ a2. If a person is indifferent between the two outcomes a1 and
a2, it will be shown as a1 ∼ a1. Showing a1  a2 means that person either prefers
outcome a1 to outcome a2 or is indifferent between the two outcomes.
Definition 1. (rationality ) An individual will be called rational under certainty
if their preferences for outcomes satisfy the following conditions:
1. (Completeness) Either a1  a2 or a2  a1
2. (Transitivity) If a1  a2 and a2  a3 then a1  a3
The completeness condition ensures that all outcomes can be compared with
each other. The transitivity condition implies that outcomes can be listed in order
of preference [17]. One of the important problems of the rational choice theory
is that it does not describe the rational behavior of human subjects as well. In
the previous methods, failure to pay attention to outcome obtained for other
decision makers is the main negligence which can have a considerable effect on
the interactive decisions. We are looking to present a new concept of rationality,
that can serve as a new foundation for human thinking.
This study demonstrates that how human decision makers behave in interactive
decisions. Here, in addition to the individual profit which has been mentioned in
the rational choice theory, we focused on profit or loss of other players which led to
the division of persons’ preferences into two classes. The first class is the individual
preferences to maximize his benefit or minimize his loss and the second class is
preferences of the individual to maximize profit or loss of others (The person’s
preferences for others). The individual’s choice among his preferences: individual
preferences, preference for others and both of them at the same time, makes his
hyper-preferences. The advantage of this concept emphasizes the importance of
outcomes of other actors in the game. Based on the idea, in most conditions,
the hyper-rationality behavior of an actor is dependent on the person and others
behavior. Therefore, we present the unified approaches to analysis and cognition
3of humans and societies behavior in social sciences. We implement the hyper-
rational choice for interpretation strategic interaction between players. For this
purpose, we will examine Prisoners Dilemma, Missile crisis game and Trickery
game.
Results
Hyper-rational Choice
Numerous results from experimental economics have shown that classic rationality
assumptions do not describe the behavior of real human subjects. For example,
it is not uncommon for people, in experimental situations, to indicate that they
prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A [18]. If we consider profit or loss of other persons
given rational behaviour of the persons which is based on individual benefit, some
of the human behaviors may be described. In 1926 Ragnar Frisch developed for
the first time a mathematical model of preferences in the context of economic
demand and utility functions [19, 20]. In 1944, Von Neumann and Morgenstern
introduced the preferences as a formal relation. [16].
Here we divide preferences of people into two classes. The first class is a set of
individual preferences (include: individual profit, individual loss and indifferent
between profit and loss) of the person which seek to maximize his profit or
minimize his loss. The second class is a set of preferences for others (include:
profit for other, loss for other and indifferent between profit or loss for others) of
the person which seek to maximize profit or loss of other actors. Based on the
second class of preferences (The person’s preferences for others), assumption about
profit or loss of other actors can be added in the form of human behaviors such as
altruism, devotion, fraud, jealousy, and mistrust to the concept of rationality. As a
result, the person has three choices about his preferences: individual preferences,
preferences for other actors and both of them simultaneously. Therefore, an
individuals desires in a multiple person decisionmaking the problem that leads to a
ranking of preferences in terms of hyper-preferences. Hence, the hyper-preferences
for each individual specifies six behavioral options. Here, we consider four main
behavioral options: individual profit, individual loss, profit for others and loss for
others. In the following, we want to turn a rational individual into a hyper-rational
individual.
Now consider a rational individual. The set of possible choices of rational
individual i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} is shown with Ai = {a1, a2, ..., an}. Given hyper-
preferences, how will a hyper-rational individual behave? We assume that given a
set of choices B ⊆ A = A1 ×A2 × ...×An. We define the weak hyper-preferences
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of actor i’ over the set B as follows:
(a1, a2, ..., an)i 
′
(b1, b2, ..., bn)i ⇔ either a1  b1 or a1  b1 based on actor i
′ preferences
for actor 1 and either a2  b2 or a2  b2 based on actor i
′ preferences
for actor 2 and either ai  bi or ai  bi based on actor i
′ preferences
and either an  bn or an  bn based on actor i
′ preferences for actor n,
where relation  is complete and transitive. We say that (a1, a2, ..., an) is strictly
preferred to (b1, b2, ..., bn), or (a1, a2, ..., an) ≻
′
(b1, b2, ..., bn), if (a1, a2, ..., an) 
′
(b1, b2, ..., bn) but not (b1, b2, ..., bn) 
′
(a1, a2, ..., an). We say the actor is indiffer-
ent between (a1, a2, ..., an) and (b1, b2, ..., bn), or (a1, a2, ..., an) ∼
′
(b1, b2, ..., bn), if
(a1, a2, ..., an) 
′
(b1, b2, ..., bn) and (b1, b2, ..., bn) 
′
(a1, a2, ..., an). So, we defined
set of hyper-preference over set of preferences.
Definition 2. The relation 
′
on B is complete if for all
(a1, a2, ..., an), (b1, b2, ..., bn) ∈ B either (a1, a2, ..., an) 
′
(b1, b2, ..., bn) or
(b1, b2, ..., bn) 
′
(a1, a2, ..., an), or both.
The completeness condition ensures that all action profiles can be compared
with each other. Hyper-preferences help the person to consider more realistic
conditions for decision-making and specify his objectives. Hyper-preferences of
a individual has taxonomy characteristic. Taxonomy of hyper-preference means
that if we face an actor with two choices of hyper-preferences, she will necessarily
have an opinion on which she likes more. Taxonomy of actor’s hyper-preferences
depends on environmental condition, the kind of behavior interactive (kind of
interactive person), beliefs system of itself and others and valuation system of
itself and others. Taxonomy of hyper-preferences helps to a person to retrieve
his/her preferences and reduces the rate of computation. Taxonomy of hyper-
preferences helps the actor checked the situation rapidly and the decision-making
process and its criteria are discovered. Taxonomy of hyper-preferences helps to
individual to consider benefit of observing the value of norms or loss resulting
from not observing them. Considering situations which the individual faces, we
define hyper-rationality as follows:
Definition 3. (Hyper-rational ) An individual will be called hyper-rational
under certainty if is a rational (see Definition 1.) and their hyper-preferences
for preferences (individual or for others) satisfy at least one of the following
conditions:
1. The actor chooses from the set of available alternatives (actions) based on
individual preferences;
2. The actor chooses from the set of available alternatives (actions) based on
preferences for other actors.
It can be concluded that each hyper-rational actor is a rational actor, but each
rational actor is not a hyper-rational actor. In this concept, we call a person hyper-
rational if he considers profit or loss of others in his interaction with other people
5in society in addition to individual profit or loss. Based on the concept of hyper-
rationality, an actor may not identify an action which has the maximum benefit
for him but may be able to choose an action which has the maximum profit or loss
for other actors. So, attention to the emphasis on the importance of the outcome of
other actors in the game is among the advantage of this concept. Hyper-rationality
doesnt simplify decision-making but specifies how to make a decision. This concept
promotes both cooperative and non-cooperative behavior, But in practice, more
cooperation is considered. Hyper-rational actor removes information cognitive and
processing constraints based on the taxonomy of hyper-preferences. The hyper-
rational actor makes a decision based on his hyper-preferences and chooses an
action which is based on his targets despite knowing no access to full information.
The number of decision-making stages is different among persons considering
prioritization of hyper-preferences; therefore, hyper-rational doesn’t mean limited
searching. In definition of hyper-rationality, condition (2) from Definition 1. is not
necessary. In other words, if an individual simultaneously considers two classes
of preferences, transitivity property of outcomes may do not exist. For example,
in Prisoners Dilemma based on collective profit or collective loss, transitivity
property hyper-preferences do not exist.
Some human behaviors can be expressed with help of hyper-rationality concept.
The emergence of behavior such as jealousy in a person is due to the fact that
since the person cannot increase his benefit and is unhappy of that, he prefers
not to give more benefit to others. Also, a benevolent player can choose an action
based on his hyper-rationality which will bring more benefits to others. In contrast
to a rational player with a hyper-rational player, the hyper-rational player has
more chance of winning. Therefore, the concept of hyper-rationality can give a
new concept of rationality called hyper-rational choice theory. Based on the new
concept of hyper-rational choice, some of the human behaviors can be modeled
with help of game theory.
Hyper-rational Choice as the basis for game theory
Game theory aims to help us understand situations in which decision-makers
interact. Like other sciences, game theory consists of a collection of models. A
model is an abstraction we use to understand our observations and experiences
[21]. The concept of ”game” indicates interactions between the players well, but
this concept has not been clarified in the mathematical modeling. In other words,
mathematical modeling is defective and cannot express dependency of strategy
choice by a player on strategy choice by other players. In the mathematical
modeling, the dependency of decision choice by players has been expressed only
based on the individual benefit of the players and no discussion has been made
about player’s preferences of loss or profit of other players. In the theory of the
game, different methods are used for finding equilibrium with help of rationality
concept and one of these methods is the best response function [22]. Based on the
definition of the best response function, equilibrium is a point in which strategy
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chosen by each individual is the best response to the strategies chosen by other
players and maximize personal profit [23].
Now, we apply hyper-rational choice theory as a basis and main element of
modeling in game theory. With help of hyper-rationality, we analyze conditions
of a strategic game. Hyper-rationality in game theory helps the player choose
successful strategies of the game in interactive conditions and reproduce them. The
concept of hyper-rationality helps the game theory enter other fields of sciences
with more logical power. We assume that each player in the game is hyper-rational.
Thus, a hyper-rational player will renormalize her opinion based on the common
knowledge that each player is hyper-rational. Below, we show the best response
functions based on hyper-preferences of players with B, P , and L. Precisely, we
define the set-valued function Bi by
Bi(a−i) :=
{
ai ∈ Ai : ui(ai, a−i) ≥ ui(a
′
i
, a−i) for all a
′
i
∈ Ai
}
,
any action in Bi(a−i) is at least as good based on individual benefit for player
i as every other action of player i when the other players actions are given by
a−i. We call Bi the best response function of player i based on individual benefit.
Precisely, we define the set-valued function Ki by
Pi(a−i) :=
{
ai ∈ Ai : u−i(ai, a−i) ≥ u−i(a
′
i
, a−i) for all a
′
i
∈ Ai
}
,
any action in Ki(a−i) for player i relative to every other action of player i is at
least the best based on profit for other players when the other players actions are
given by a−i. We call Ki the best response function of player i based on profit for
other players. Precisely, we define the set-valued function Li by
Li(a−i) :=
{
ai ∈ Ai : u−i(ai, a−i) ≤ u−i(a
′
i
, a−i) for all a
′
i
∈ Ai
}
,
any action in Li(a−i) for player i relative to every other action of player i is at
least as good based on the loss for other players when the other players actions are
given by a−i. We call Li the best response function of player i based on the loss
of other players. In competitive interactions, we define strictly dominant action
and weakly dominant action based on the loss of other players.
Definition 4. ( Strict domination of loss) In a strategic game for player i, action
a
′′
i
is strictly dominant on her action a
′
i
for loss of others, if we have
u−i(a
′′
i
, a−i) < u−i(a
′
i
, a−i) for every a−i ∈ A−i,
where ui is a payoff function that represents player is preferences. It is defined
as strictly dominant action based on benefit for other players similar, but the
difference is that direction of the relation < is changed.
7Definition 5. ( Weak domination of loss) In a strategic game for player i, action
a
′′
i
is weakly dominant on her action a
′
i
for loss of others, if we have :
u−i(a
′′
i
, a−i) ≤ u−i(a
′
i
, a−i) for every a−i ∈ A−i
and
u−i(a
′′
i
, a−i) < u−i(a
′
i
, a−i) for some a−i ∈ A−i,
where ui is a payoff function that represents player is preferences. It is defined
as weakly dominant action based on benefit for other players similar, but the
difference is that direction of relations ≤ and < is changed.
The actions which are chosen based on the concept of hyper-rationality (hyper-
preferences) and rationality of the players may be similar or different. To prevent
ambiguity in interactions, we divide actions of players into three classes as strictly
dominant action and weakly dominant action based on individual benefit, strictly
dominant action and weakly dominant action based on profit for other players
and strictly dominant action and weakly dominant action based on the loss for
others. The following proposition shows a method for finding equilibrium in the
game.
Proposition 6. The action profile a∗ is a equilibrium point of strategic game if
and only if hold true in at least one of the following conditions:
• Each action of the player is the best response to actions of other players
based on personal benefit:
a∗ is in Bi(a
∗
−i
) for every player i,
• Each action of the player is the best response to actions of other players
based on the benefit of other players:
a∗ is in Ki(a
∗
−i
) for every player i.
• Each action of the player is the best response to actions of other players
based on loss of other players:
a∗ is in Li(a
∗
−i
) for every player i.
We consider equilibrium based on concept of Nash [24, 25]. Based on the concept
of hyper-rationality, equilibriums can be divided into three classes. The first class
is the equilibria which are considered based on personal benefit. The second class is
the equilibria which are selected based on profit or loss of other players. The third
class is the equilibria which are considered based on individual benefit and loss or
profit of other players at the same time. An action profile may be selected which
is the equilibrium point of the game based on hyper-preference of the maximum
loss for other players and also has the maximum loss for all players, but it is not
8 ()
Nash equilibrium based on the classic concept of rationality. In addition, based on
this concept, games may have one (second best), two (Prisoner’s Dilemma), three
(Trickery game) and four (Chicken game) equilibrium or may has not equilibrium.
For example, the Matching pennies is not in equilibrium and Missile crisis game
has two equilibrium. Hyper-rationality helps the analyst to interpret every cell
of the game table and have more accurate analysis. Furthermore, with help of
concept of hyper-rationality, we introduce a new definition of equilibrium in the
game as hyper-equilibrium.
Definition 7. (Hyper-equilibrium ) The action profile b∗ = (a
′
i
, a∗
−i
) in a strategic
game is a hyper-equilibrium if , only for every player i and every action a∗
i
of player
i, b∗ is at least as good according to player is hyper-preferences as the action
profile (a∗
i
, a∗
−i
) in which player i chooses a∗
i
while every other players chooses
a∗
−i
. Equivalently, for every player i, based on benefit of other players
u−i(a
′
i
, a∗
−i
) ≥ u−i(a
∗
i
, a∗
−i
) for all a∗
i
∈ Ai,
or for every player i, based on loss of other players
u−i(a
′
i
, a∗
−i
) ≤ u−i(a
∗
i
, a∗
−i
) for all a∗
i
∈ Ai,
where ui is a payoff function that represents player is preferences. Hyper-
equilibrium is a point in which only one player can increase or decrease outcome of
other players by changing his action without other players having motivation for
the change of action. In the next section, we explain how human decision makers
behave in interactive decisions and also presented an important game which has
special equilibrium which we call hyper-equilibrium.
Behavior of individuals in human societies
In a social dilemma game, there are different behavioral options, for cooperation
and competition [26]. There are several studies which provide the main theoretical
insights of the general psychological game framework [27, 3]. The classical theory
of game relies on assumptions of perfect rationality and full common knowledge
that are far removed from the cognitive capacities of human players and of
limited use in explaining human strategic behavior. On the other hand, blind
experimentation is also unhelpful, because the proper use of experiments is to
test hypotheses, and without good hypotheses, no useful progress can be made
[28]. Interactions between psychologists and economists have been marked more
by conflict than by collaboration and the absence of a common research language
impedes communication between this the disciplines[1]. Some of the studies
describe the relationship between psychologists and economists [2, 3, 4, 5]. In
this section, we review and interpret Prisoners Dilemma, Missile crisis game and
Trickery game, with the help of the concept of hyper-rationality.
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Figure 1. Prisoner’s dilemma g1
Prisoner’s Dilemma
The essence of cooperation is described by the Prisoners Dilemma [29].
Cooperation is a hallmark of human society [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. In
theory of games, there has been much interest in exploring the Prisoners Dilemma.
Here we investigate depends on the claim that each player in the Prisoners
Dilemma is hyper-rational. In Fig. 1 based on definitions of hyper-rationality,
in Prisoner’s Dilemma g1 for both players based on loss of other players, defect
D is a strictly dominant action of loss and cooperate C is a strictly dominated
action of loss. In this game, equilibrium point (D,D) is an equilibrium which
the players selected based on loss of the opponent. For both players, based on
the benefit of other players, Cooperate is a strictly dominant action of profit and
defect is a strictly dominated action for profit. So, equilibrium point (C,C) is
an equilibrium which the players selected based on the benefit of the opponent.
Therefore, Based on the hyper-rationality concept, prisoner’s dilemma has two
equilibria points (C,C) and (D,D). Hofstadter claims that for the super-rational
it is evident that universal cooperation is the best option [38, 39]. We state that
either cooperation or defection is the best option for the hyper-rational player
depending on environmental conditions (competitive, peace, war,...) and the kind
of behavior interactive (friend, enemy,...) in game. One can almost be claimed that
the cooperation and the defection are two hyper-rational options. On the other
hand, when players cannot guarantee their profit, they can optimize the situation
by defection. As a result, cooperation is not always the best option.
Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what
is best for the group [29]. How can the cooperation be promoted in the repeated
prisoners dilemma? Some experimental papers giving support to the promotion of
cooperation have used from complicated laboratory conditions or add strategy to
Prisoner’s Dilemma [40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47]. We want to answer the above
question using the concept of hyper-rationality. In classical game theory, all the
variety of 2× 2 symmetric games rests in the relative values of the four payoffs
(C,C), (D,D), (D,C) and (C,D). There are twenty-four possible rankings of four
payoffs, and thus twenty-four symmetric 2× 2 games [48]. In Prisoners Dilemma
based on classical rationality, row player prefers (D,C) to (C,C) to (D,D)
to (C,D) ((D,C)  (C,C)  (D,D)  (C,D)). The hyper-rationality of player
thinks about profit or loss of other players in addition to his personal profit or
loss and then will choose an action which is desirable to him. As mentioned above,
taxonomy of players hyper-preferences depends on environmental condition, the
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kind of behavior interactive, self-evaluation system and evaluation system of
other interacting persons. Taxonomy of players hyper-preferences has four main
behavioral options: individual profit, individual loss, profit for others and loss
for others. Hence, for row player take taxonomy of hyper-preferences considering
four main behavioral options: based on individual profit: (D,C) 
′
(C,C) 
′
(D,D) 
′
(C,D), based on individual loss: (C,D) 
′
(D,D) 
′
(C,C) 
′
(D,C),
based on profit for others: (C,D) 
′
(C,C) 
′
(D,D) 
′
(D,C), based on loss for
others: (D,C) 
′
(D,D) 
′
(C,C) 
′
(C,D).
Taxonomy of hyper-preferences helps to players consider two main behavioral
options simultaneously, for example: collective profit or collective loss. If
interaction between players is based on collective benefit thinking, both player
prefers: either (C,C) 
′
(D,D) 
′
(D,C) 
′
(C,D) or (C,C) 
′
(D,D) 
′
(C,D) 
′
(D,C). On the other hand, the concept of hyper-rationality explains
that, based on the profit of other players, cooperation is a strictly dominant
action. Taxonomy of hyper-preferences helps to players consider two principles
simultaneously in interactions: first, treat others as we ourselves would like to be
treated and second, not treat others as we ourselves would not like to be treated.
According to the second principle, the profiles strategy (C,D) and (D,C) is not
selected. Based on collective benefit thinking (C,C) is preferred to (D,D) by two
players. So, according to the first principle, the profiles strategy (C,C) is selected.
In repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the taxonomy of two principles are likely to lead
to this mechanism for the promotion of cooperation. Hence, this study with the
help of the concept of hyper-rationality in game theory, seeks to the promotion
of cooperation between the players, which is a sign of the power of this concept.
Therefore, the concept of hyper-rationality helps to understand the evolution of
cooperation.
There are two competing classes of theories have been proposed to explain
the relationship between actions and beliefs. The first class of theories, coming
from economics, suggests that beliefs cause actions. The second class of theories,
proposed by psychologist, suggest that actions cause beliefs [2, 3]. Interactions
between psychologists and economists have been marked more by conflict than
by collaboration [1]. Bruine de Bruin and Fischhoff describe four conditions that
promoted transdisciplinary collaborations between psychologists and economists
[5]. We explore the players’ behavior with the help of the concept of hyper-
rationality. This concept explains that, based on the loss of other players, defection
is a strictly dominant action. If interaction between players is based on collective
loss thinking, both player prefers: either (D,D) 
′
(C,C) 
′
(D,C) 
′
(C,D),
or (D,D) 
′
(C,C) 
′
(C,D) 
′
(D,C). These interpretations help to enlarge
our understanding of psychological aspects of strategy choices in games and
also provide an analysis of the decision-making process with cognitive economics
approach at the same time. For example, considering two principles above and
based on collective thinking, prefers (D,D) to (C,C) by two player shows
that players are spiteful individuals and only think to cause loss to others. In
other words, the hyper-preferences indicate that the kind of behavior interactive,
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B 3,3 1,4
A 2,2 4,1
g3 C D
C 4,3 2,4
D 3,1 2,1
Figure 2. Missile crisis game g2 and Trickery game g3
environmental conditions, and valuation system are based on hostility and players
at this point have considered the maximum loss to other, which this is a common
research language between psychologists and economists.
Missile crisis game
In Theory of Moves, Steven Brams developed a general dynamic modeling
framework and used it to evaluate Cuban missile crisis [49]. In this book, he
explains that the goal of the United States was immediate removal of the Soviet
missiles, and United States policymakers seriously considered two strategies to
achieve this end:
1. A naval blockade (B), or ”quarantine” as it was euphemistically called, to
prevent shipment of further missiles, possibly followed by stronger action to induce
the Soviet Union to withdraw those missiles already installed.
2. A ”surgical” air strike (A) to wipe out the missiles already installed, insofar as
possible, perhaps followed by an invasion of the island.
The alternatives open to Soviet policy makers were:
1. Withdrawal ( W) of their missiles.
2. Maintenance (M) of their missiles.
Instead, he begins by considering the payoff matrix given in Fig. 2. In Cuban
missile crisis, Brams concludes that the two countries reached a compromise. In
other words, in this crisis the compromise outcome or (3, 3) is a Nash equilibrium.
This game has two Nash equilibrium (A,W ) and (B,W ). In game g2, for the US,
based on damage for Soviets, A is a strictly dominant action of loss for Soviets
and B is a strictly dominated action of loss for Soviets. Why did not the US
an air strike that destroys the missiles? Soviet response to this strategy makes
pairs of his rational actions. Recently Eshaghi and Askari [50] have introduced
the definition of pair of rational actions. Therefore, pairs of actions (A,W ) and
(A,M) are rational for Soviet. Bram’s write: an air strike that destroys the missiles
that the Soviets were maintaining is an ”honorable” U.S. action, (its best state)
and thwarts the Soviets (their worst state)- (4, 1). An air strike that destroys
the missiles that the Soviets were withdrawing is a ”dishonorable” U.S. action
(its next-worst state) and thwarts the Soviets (their next-worst state)- (2, 2).
According to the concept of hyper-rationality, based on the loss for the US, pair of
actions (A,W ) is a pair of hyper-rationality. So, a pair of actions (A,W ) is a Nash
equilibrium. In this game, for the US, based on benefit for Soviets, B is a strictly
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dominant action of profit for Soviets and A is a strictly dominated action of profit
for Soviets. Therefore, pairs of actions (B,W ) and (B,M) are rational for Soviet.
According to the concept of hyper-rationality, based on benefit for the US, a pair of
actions (B,W ) is a pair of hyper-rationality. So, a pair of actions (B,W ) is a Nash
equilibrium. Consequently, the United States has two dominant actions: B based
on benefit to Soviets and A based on the loss to Soviets. On the other hand, if
interaction between the United States and the Soviets is based on collective benefit
thinking, both player prefers: either (B,W ) 
′
(A,W ) 
′
(A,M) 
′
(B,M) or
(B,W ) 
′
(A,W ) 
′
(B,M) 
′
(A,M). Therefore, in Missile crisis game, it can
be said that the two countries considered the collective benefits and reached a
compromise.
Trickery game
Recently Eshaghi and Askari introduced Trickery game [50]. This game shows
a good reason for the trickery of some people in everyday life, which one of
the players can with cunning change his action that reduces the payoff, other
players. We consider row player as player 1 and column player as player 2. The
trickery game g3 table is given in Fig. 2. The above game is an asymmetric
game. This game has three Nash equilibriums (C,D), (D,D) and (C,C). In the
trickery game, player 1 has weakly dominant action C and weakly dominated
action D based on individual benefit. Player 2 has weakly dominant action
D and weakly dominated action C based on individual benefit. Also, in this
game, player 1 has strictly dominant action D and strictly dominated action
C based on loss of player 2. Player 2 has strictly dominant action D and strictly
dominated action C based on loss of player 1. According to the concept of classic
rationality, two Nash equilibria (C,D) and (D,D) have equal payoff for player
1, but considering the concept of hyper-rationality, based on loss for player 2
given, (D,C) ∼
′
(D,D) 
′
(C,C) 
′
(C,D), player 1 prefer (D,D) to (C,D).
With assumption choosing strictly dominant action D for player 2 and hyper-
rationality, concept of hyper-rationality for player 1 rules that if he seeks to
benefit player 2, he will choose C, so the equilibrium of game is (C,D), if he
seeks to cause loss to player 2, he will choose D because the opponent will sustain
more loss and his outcome will remain fixed, therefore the equilibrium game is
(D,D). Therefore, the concept of hyper-rationality helps to understand a common
research language between psychologists and economists.
In this game, there are two Nash equilibrium points and based on the
definition of Nash equilibrium, no player will be motivated to change his action
in equilibrium point. Based on concept of hyper-rationality, given fixed defect of
player 2, we can see that if layer 1, seeks to incur loss to his opponent, he will
be motivated to change his action in equilibrium point (C,D) and can transfer
game equilibrium to point (D,D). We want to see what reaction player 2, will
show if player 1, chooses D. With choosing D by player 1, choosing C and D will
give equal outcome for player 2, but if player 2, prefer loss of opponent, we will
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find that he doesnt choose strictly dominated action C and by choosing strictly
dominant action D will incur more loss to player 1. So, we conclude that pair of
action (D,C) is not chosen and player 2, is not motivated to change his action in
equilibrium point (D,D). Therefore, action profile (D,D) is a hyper-equilibrium.
In Trickery game, player 1, can use this hyper-equilibrium as a credible threat, to
force player 2 to choose cooperation. So, action profile (C,C) is an equilibrium
which chooses based on the collective benefit and pressure of the player 1.
Discussion
The theory of rational choice seeks to explain the behavior of the person who
behaves wisely and look for to maximize his benefits. The theory of hyper-
rational choice seeks to explain the behavior of the person who behaves wisely
and considers benefit or loss of others in addition to the individual benefit. The
theory of hyper-rational choice can be applied instead of the theory of rational
choice in social sciences and society can be analyzed based on two methodological
individualistic and methodological collective approaches so that human society
can be understood easily and predicted more fluently. In this theory, the hyper-
rational actor thinks about the benefit (collective benefit) and loss (collective
loss) of other actors beside his own benefit and then chooses an action. We also
presented a new definition as hyper-rationality. Based on this concept, we call a
person hyper-rational if results of choosing any action are comparable with other
actions for the person and also the person can recognize what action is the most
beneficial to him among the accessible actions and what action causes loss or
benefit of other players. Based on the concept of hyper-rationality, a player may
not recognize that what action is the most beneficial to him but can choose an
action which causes the maximum loss or benefit for other players. According to
this concept, assumption about profit or loss to other actors can be added in the
form of human behaviors such as altruism, devotion, fraud, jealousy, and mistrust
to the concept of rationality. This new concept can describe some of the human
behaviors well.
Moreover, new definitions such as the best response functions, strictly dominant
action and weakly dominant action based on loss of other players. With the help of
these definitions, we have introduced a method for finding equilibrium in the game
and classified the equilibriums. In some of these games, we achieved equilibriums
which are not considered as game equilibrium based on the classic concept of
rationality. We presented an important game as trickery game which has special
equilibrium which we call hyper-equilibrium. The hyper-equilibrium is the point
in which only one player can displace equilibrium to another point by changing
his action which causes profit or loss to other players so they cannot change their
action. The theory of hyper-rational choice can be applied as a basis for the theory
of decision-making, the theory of collective action and social sciences issues and
new results can be obtained in this way. Hyper-rationality can be mentioned and
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investigated as uncertainty. We also believe that our current design has some
additional advantages over previous ones
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